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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUPREME COURT INDICATES
SIGNIFICANT LIMITATION UPON REVIEW OF STATE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
In affirming convictions pursuant to a Texas statute implement-
ing common law recidivist procedure, the Supreme Court attenu-
ated the efficacy of allegations of jury prejudice and of alternative
means as constitutional determinants in the consideration -of crim-
inal procedures absent potential frustration of specific constitu-
tional provisions. Based upon pragmatic considerations of judicial
efficiency and deference to state prerogative, the decision may ex-
tend beyond its unique factual situation to narrow significantly the
role -of due process in defining the range of permissible state crim-
inal procedures.
RECDIVIST statutes characteristically provide that criminal de-
fendants who have previously been convicted of certain crimes will
receive harsher punishment than first offenders.1 Such statutes do
not create an independent crime nor impose additional punishment
for past offenses; rather, an increased penalty is assigned for the
present crime because of the defendant's recidivist status.2 Although
I Recidivist statutes are found in virtually all states. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT.
§ 12.55.060 (Supp. 1966); AmuZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1649 to -50 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 39-11-12 (Supp. 1966); Micir. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.1082 to .1085 (1954); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14-19, 15-147 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-11 to -18 (1966); 2 WHAR-
TON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENcE § 645 (Anderson ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON];
Note, 82 TUL. L. REv. 765, 768 (1958). See generally RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
CORRECTION 392-426 (1963) [hereinafter cited as RUBIN]; G. Brown, The Treatment of
the Recidivist in the United States, 23 CAN. B. REv. 640 (1945); L. Brown, West
Virginia Habitual Criminal Law, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 80 (1956); Note, Court Treatment
of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 CoLuM. L. REv. 238 (1948); Comment, 26 TENN. L.
REv. 259 (1959).
2 E.g., Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 624 (1912); McDonald v. Massachu-
setts, 180 U.S. 311, 812 (1901); McGarry v. Fogliani, 870 F.2d 42, 43-44 (9th Cir. 1966);
State v. Davis, 140 N.W.2d 925 (Iowa 1966); Howard v. State, 422 P.2d 548 (Nev.
1967); State v. Washington, 47 N.J. 244, 220 A.2d 185 (1966); State ex rel. Combs v.
Boles, 151 S.E.2d 115 (W. Va. 1966). See generally RUBIN 393; Note, 48 COLUM. L. REv.
238 (1948); Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 210 (1958); Comment, 48 VA. L. REv. 597, 603 (1962).
Compare Specht v. Patterson, 886 U.S. 605 (1967).
It is well settled that recidivist laws are not, as a general matter, constitutionally
infirm. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (constitutionality of statutes no
longer open to question); Bryger v. Burke, 834 U.S. 728 (1948) (statutes do not subject
defendant to double jeopardy); McDonald v. Massachusetts, supra (statutes do not
impair right to trial by jury or equal protection of the laws); Moore v. Missouri, 159
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recidivist laws are uniform in their ultimate effect, the procedures
by which they are implemented differ widely among the various
jurisdictions. For example, a Texas statute was formerly interpreted
to provide that allegations and evidence of a defendant's past con-
victions were to be presented to the jury simultaneously with evi-
dence concerning the present crime.4 In the recent Supreme Court
case of Spencer v. Texas,5 it was contended that this procedure,
utilized in conjunction with the Texas recidivist statute,0 unfairly in-
fluenced the jury's determination of guilt of the present crime and
thus violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Rejecting this contention, a divided Court reconciled diversity among
the courts of appea 7 and delineated vaguely defined limitations upon
Supreme Court intervention in state criminal procedures.
Leon Spencer was indicted for murder with malice of his common-
law wife. Pursuant to Texas law,8 the indictment also alleged that
Spencer previously had been convicted of a similar offense which fact,
if proved, would require the jury9 to determine a sentence of death
U.S. 673 (1895) (statutes do not result in double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punish-
ment nor deny equal protection of the laws); Price v. Allgood, 369 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.
1966); Rider v. Crouse, 357 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1966); People v. Cohen, 366 Ill. 190, 8
N.E.2d 184 (1937); State v. Zywicki, 175 Minn. 508, 221 N.W. 900 (1928); State v.
Rhodes, 408 S.W.2d. 68 (Mo. 1966); State v. Roberts, 400 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. 1966);
Bailleaux v. Gladen, 230 Ore. 606, 370 P.2d 722, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 848 (1962);
State v. Lei, 59 Wash. 2d 1, 365 P.2d 609 (1961); Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 210 (1958);
Note, 11 RUrGERs L. Rxv. 654, 660 (1957). See also Chewning v. Cunningham, 368
U.S. 443 (1962); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Graham v. West Virginia, supra;
Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908).
3 TEXAS CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 642 (1941).
'Article 642 has since been repealed by TEXAs CODE CRim. PRoc. art. 36.01 (1965).
The more recent statute explicitly postpones the presentation of prior crimes evidence
to the jury until after a determination of guilt in non-capital cases. See TEXAS CODE
CaM. PROC. art. 37.07 (1965).
- 385 U.S. 554 (1967), affirming 389 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Crim. 1965), rehearing denied,
386 U.S. 969 (1967).
6 TExAs PEN. CODE ANN. arts. 61-64 (1952).
Procedures similar to that utilized in Spencer had been held unconstitutional by
the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Scoleri v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 (1963), when applied in capital cases and by the
Fourth Circuit in all cases, Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963). However,
such procedures had been found constitutional by the Eighth Circuit in Wolfe v. Nash,
313 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 817 (1963) and the Fifth Circuit in
Taylor v. Beto, 346 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1965) and Reed v. Beto, 343 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.
1955), af'd, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). Cf. Powell v. United States, 35 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.
1929). At least one district court had rejected the Fourth Circuit rule: United States
ex rel. Jenkins v. Follette, 257 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
'TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 642 (1941).
'TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 693 (1941).
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or of life imprisonment.10 The defendant unsuccessfully offered to
stipulate that he had been previously convicted as alleged in the in-
dictment. Subsequently, his objections both to the reading of the
unexpurgated indictment and to the introduction of supporting evi-
dence were denied." Although the jury was charged concerning the
choice of penalty if it found the prior conviction proved, it was
specifically instructed not to weigh the recidivist evidence in con-
sidering guilt upon the substantive charge.' 2  The jury found
Spencer guilty on both counts and he was sentenced to death.'3
Imposition of the enhanced penalty under most recidivist statutes
requires that the defendant's prior convictions be proved before a
jury.' 4 Divergence of opinion as to when proof of recidivism should
be made has engendered three basic procedures.' 5 One of these, the
10 The applicable article of the Texas recidivist statute, TEXAS PEN. CODE ANN. art.
64 (1952), provides as follows: "A person convicted a second time of any offense to which
the penalty of death is affixed as an alternative punishment shall not receive on such
second conviction a less punishment than imprisonment for life ...."
If the prior convictions were not proved, the sentence could be death or imprison-
ment for not less than two years. TEXAS PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1257 (1952).
11385 U.S. at 557; Spencer v. State, 389 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. Grim. 1965).
12 385 U.S. at 557-58.
1 8 Ibid. Spencer encompasses three cases sharing common issues and combined for
review. The second case, Bell v. Texas, involved similar facts as to procedure and
objections. Id. at 558. However, the allegations of both present and prior crimes were
not of capital offenses, but of robbery, and thus fell under TEXAS PEN.CODE ANN. art.
62 (1948) by which punishment is to be the maximum for that particular offense.
Ibid. Moreover, punishment was set by the judge rather than the jury. Ibid. The
third case, Reed v. Beto, concerned a third-offender prosecution for burglary under
TEXAS PEN. CODE ANN. art. 63 (1948) and followed the same procedure as in Bell.
385 U.S. at 559. Reed, however, arose through petition for habeas corpus. Id. at
558 n.4. The majority opinion does not distinguish among the cases; therefore, ref-
erences to Spencer are equally applicable to all three cases. Id. at 559.
"IE.g., ALAsKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.060 (Supp. 1966); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-13-1 to -3
(1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3912 (Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.11 (1965);
IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-2208 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 747.4 (1946); Ky. REv. STAT. § 431.
190 (1962); MD. ANN. CODE, Rule 713 (1963); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1085 (1954) (jury
may be waived); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-7407 (1947); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 591:1
(1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-7 (1953); Osuo REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.13 (1953)
(jury may be waived); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5108 (d) (1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 11 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-296 (Supp. 1966); United States ex rel. Jenkins v.
Follette, 257 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); State v. Salazar, 3 Ariz. App. 114, 412 P.2d 289
(1966); State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 Ad. 452 (1921); State v. Lovejoy, 60 Idaho
632, 95 P.2d 132 (1939); Cortez v. State, 165 Tex. Grim. 320, 314 S.W.2d 589 (1958); L.
Brown, West Virginia Habitual Criminal Law, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 30, 47 (1956); Note, 25
MONT. L. REv. 250, 251 (1964); 43 TEXAs L. REv. 392 (1965). But see note 15 infra. A
number of states provide that prior convictions need not be proved if they are admitted
or stipulated. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 39-13-3 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3912 (Supp. 1966). But see Spencer v. State, 389 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Crim. 1965).
"ISee generally, Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 332 (1965). A
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"Supplementary Procedure," separates determination of present
guilt and of recidivist status into two distinct proceedings. Subse-
quent to a trial resulting in a guilty verdict, a new indictment is filed
alleging prior convictions and a new jury is empaneled to try the
charge.' 6 If the previous convictions are proved, the penalty pre-
scribed by the recidivist statute is imposed.17 This procedure thus
assures that the initial jury has no knowledge of earlier crimes while
considering present guilt, although the defendant may be unin-
formed at the inception of the first trial of the charges which may
ultimately be brought against him.'8
A second procedure, favored by a number of courts9 and com-
mentators,20 is the English-Connecticut two-stage approach.2' It
requires that the indictment be divided into two parts, the first setting
forth the substantive charge and the second, the former convictions.
fourth procedure is utilized by a few states whereby the judge, sitting without a jury,
determines proof of recidivism. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.16 (1963); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2221 (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 168.065 (1963). See Note, 48 COLUmn. L. REv. 238,
241 (1948); Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 210, 215-16 (1958); Note, 11 RUTERS L. REv. 654,
662-63 (1957).
18 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.11 (1965); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1085 (1954);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2961.13 (Page 1953); W. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 61-11-18, -19 (1966);
Note, 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 238, 240 (1948). See also Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962);
Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
17 See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, supra note 16; Graham v. West Virginia, supra note 16.
See generally Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 332, 338-47 (1965); Note,
33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 210, 213-15 (1958); Comment, 48 VA. L. REv. 597, 615-16 & n.94
(1962).
18 It has been argued that the defendant is placed in the position of defending him.
self against an unknown charge where he is not informed that after his conviction he
will be prosecuted as a recidivist. See Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 332, 339-41 (1965); 48
VA. L. RFv. 597, 617 (1962). But see Oyler v. Boles, supra note 16, at 452; Reynolds v.
Cochran, 365 U.S. 525, 530 n.7 (1961).
29 See, e.g., Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963); Haggard v. Henderson,
252 F. Supp. 763 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); Heinze v. People, 127 Colo. 54, 253 P.2d 596
(1953); State v. Johnson, 86 Idaho 51, 383 P.2d 326 (1963); Harris v. State, 369 P.2d
187 (Okla. Crim. 1962); Harrison v. State, 394 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1965); State v. Stewart,
110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383 (1946); State v. Kirkpatrick, 181 Wash. 313, 43 P.2d 44
(1935).
20 See, e.g., Note, 48 COLUM. L. Rv. 238, 242, 247-49 (1948); Note, 25 MONT. L. REv.
250 (1964); Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 332 (1965); Note, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 742, 747 (1954);
Note, 11 RuTGREs L. REv. 654, 663 (1957); Note, 14 TEMPLE L.Q. 386, 394-95 (1940);
43 TrxAs L. REv. 392, 393 (1965).
21 English law early provided that evidence of previous convictions was not to be
presented to the jury until guilt had been determined on the substantive offense. If the
prior convictions had been alleged in the indictment, that portion was not to be read
until after guilt had been established. Previous Convictions Act, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. IV,
c. 111. From this statute there subsequently developed a two-step procedure under
which the jury neither received evidence of prior convictions nor determined habitual
offender status until it had convicted the defendant of the present crime. See also
[Vol. 1967: 857
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In the absence of the jury, the entire indictment is read to the de-
fendant and he is asked to plead to both allegations. If he admits
only the prior convictions, then trial is held on the present charge
with no further reference to the defendant's record. If the accused
denies both parts of the indictment, only the first section is read to
the jury, and upon it trial is commenced. Should the defendant be
found guilty, the second portion of the indictment is read to the jury,
recidivist status is determined, and the appropriate penalty is as-
signed.2 2 Here again the jury remains unaware of prior convictions
while determining substantive guilt, but both issues are conveniently
tried before the same jury in the same proceeding.23
The common law procedure utilized by Texas in Spencer was
once employed by a majority of states, although its popularity has
declined in recent years. 24 It is the only process whereby, in a unitary
proceeding, recidivist evidence precedes a determination of guilt.
Moreover, the recidivist evidence may be introduced at the trial
prior to evidence upon the present charge.25 The common law
procedure is a recognized exception to the general rule that in
criminal proceedings the introduction of evidence concerning past
convictions constitutes prejudicial error.26  While this procedure
Larceny Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 96, § 116; Regina v. Shuttleworth, 3 C&K 375, 376,
175 Eng. Rep. 596 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1851).
This dual procedure was first adopted in the United States by the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors in State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 Ad. 452 (1921).
22 See generally Harrison v. State, S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1965); Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv.
210, 216-17 (1958).
23 Moreover, under Connecticut procedure, the defendant is fully informed at the
inception of his trial as to the full extent of the charges against him. Compare note 18
supra.
24 See RUBN 394; Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 210, 211 (1958); Note, 14 TEMPLE L.Q.
386 (1940); Seventeen states presently utilize the common law procedure. See Note 72
infra.
25 See Hamm v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. 1966). At Spencer's trial,
each juror was informed of the recidivist issue on voir dire and the first evidence
introduced during the trial proper was of the previous conviction. Brief for Petitioner,
pp. 8-10, Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
26 It is the general rule that evidence of prior crimes or convictions may not be in-
troduced during a criminal trial. See generally McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE §§ 157-58 (1954
ed.) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK]; 1 WHARTON § 232. The exclusionary rule
is, however, qualified by a number of exceptions one of which permits the introduction
of prior crimes evidence under recidivist laws. See 1 WHARTON § 233. Other excep-
tions include the following: introduction of prior crimes evidence to prove identity;
to establish motive; to prove the existence of a conspiracy; to impeach the defendant
as a witness; to show malice; to show admissions of guilt by conduct; to show that
the act was not unintentional or without guilty knowledge; or to complete the history
of the present crime. McConuc.K § 157; see Pardo v. United States, 369 F.2d 922 (5th
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seems the most convenient to administer because it requires only a
single-stage proceeding, the fundamental criticism of the common law
approach concerns the potentially prejudicial effect of informing the
jury of alleged prior crimes before they determine substantive guilt.2T
According to the allegations in Spencer, to require such jury cog-
nizance of the defendant's prior crimes, in the light of feasible alterna-
tive means of determining recidivist status, so unfairly influenced the
jury as to deny a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 28
Cir. 1966); People v. Ing, 65 Cal. 2d 650, 55 Cal. Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590 (1967); Steppe v.
State, 193 So. 2d 617 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967); People v. Clark, 223 N.E.2d 272 (Ill.
1966).
The general exclusionary rule is based upon the notion that evidence of prior
crimes may unduly prejudice the jury against the defendant in determining his guilt
with respect to the present crime. See, e.g., Swann v. United States, 195 F.2d 689,
690-91 (4th Cir. 1952). Compare Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). See
generally McCoRmiCK § 157; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 193-94 (3d ed. 1940). The excep-
tions to this rule denote those situations in which the relevancy and probative value
of the prior crimes evidence is considered to outweigh its prejudicial effect. See
Orfield, Relevancy in Criminal Evidence, 43 NEB. L. REv. 485, 517-31 (1964); Comment,
70 YALE L.J. 763, 763-68 (1961).
Three arguments are generally propounded to justify the exception for proof of
prior crimes under common law recidivist procedures. Since the former convictions are
a constituent fact of the aggravated penalty, it is required that they be proved at a
hearing where the defendant has an opportunity to challenge. See, e.g., People v. Stamp-
hill, 166 Cal. App. 2d 749, 333 P.2d 270 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); People v. Wagner, 78 Cal.
App. 503, 248 P. 946 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926); Smith v. State, 243 Ind. 74, 181 N.E.2d
520 (1962); State v. McClay, 146 Me. 104, 78 At. 2d 347 (1951); State v. Ruble, 77
N.D. 79, 40 N.W.2d 794 (1950); Palmer v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 536, 229 S.W.2d 174
(1950); Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 210, 212 (1958). Some courts have held that it is
necessary to place the recidivist issue before the jury to enable that body properly to
set the punishment where it performs that function. See, e.g., Yates v. State, 245 Ala.
490, 17 So. 2d 777 (1944); State v. Holman, 86 Ariz. 280, 356 P.2d 27 (1960); Berry v.
State, 51 Ga. App. 442, 180 S.E. 635 (1935); Petition of Jones, 144 Mont. 13, 393 P.2d 780
(1964); Redding v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 535, 265 S.W.2d 811 (1954); Note, 25 MONT.
L. REv. 250, 252 (1964). In other cases, the introduction of evidence of prior criminal
activity during the trial proceeding has been considered required by the statutory
provisions. See, e.g., People v. Hoerler, 208 Cal. App. 2d 402, 25 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962).
2 See Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 332, 337-38 (1965); Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 210, 211,
217-18 (1958); Note, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 742, 744, 750 (1954). Objection to the conse-
quential prejudice produced by the common law procedure has resulted in its abandon-
ment in many states. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 239 Ark. 836, 394 S.W.2d 601 (1965);
Shargaa v. State, 102 So. 2d 814 (Fla.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958); State v. John-
son, 86 Idaho 51, 383 P.2d 326 (1963); Johnson v. Cox, 72 N.M. 55, 380 P.2d 199, cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 855 (1963); Harris v. State, 369 P.2d 187 (Okla. Crim. 1962); State
v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383 (1946).
28 385 U.S. at 559. Spencer also alleged that his constitutional guarantee to an im-
partial jury under the sixth amendment had been denied, although the Court did not
consider the issue in those terms. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8, 10, Spencer v. Texas,
385 U.S. 554 (1967).
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In rejecting the due process contention, Mr. Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority,29 postulated that interference with state
criminal procedures and rules of evidence through the fourteenth
amendment should be cautiously undertaken,30 especially where no
"specific constitutional right" is involved.31 To buttress this point of
view, the Court was constrained to emphasize that undue prejudice
to the defendant depended upon a finding that the jury failed to
discharge its function properly. Weighing the possibility of such a
failure, in light of the Court's professed confidence in jury compe-
tence,32 against the state's interest in implementing its otherwise valid
statute,33 the Court found any danger of prejudice resulting from the
procedure insufficient to render it an unconstitutional practice.3 4
20 Mr. Justice Harlan was joined by Justices Black, Clark, and White in an opinion
in which Mr. Justice Stewart concurred.
Chief Justice Warren, joined by Mr. Justice Fortas, dissented in Spencer and Bell
but concurred in Reed on the ground that the invalidation of the Texas recidivist
device should not be made retroactive. Id. at 583-85. Justices Brennan and Douglas
joined the Chief Justice's dissent as to Spencer and Bell but also dissented in Reed,
contending that the reversal should be made retroactive since the Texas procedure con-
travened the "'integrity of the fact-finding process.'" Id. at 588 (quoting Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965)). Thus the decision in Reed was 7-2 and in
Spencer and Bell 5-4.
80 1d. at 562-65.
31 Id. at 564-66. See notes 42-48 infra and accompanying text.
82 385 U.S. at 561-63, 565. Compare Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 401-10 (Black, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part), 423-27 (Clark, J., dissenting), 427-40 (Harlan,
Clark, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (1964). See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S.
232, 241-42 (1957); Opper v. United States, 848 U.S. 84, 95 (1954); Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790, 800 (1952).
33 385 U.S. at 566-69.
,, Id. at 560-62, 565. Chief Justice Warren found a basis for due process objec-
tions in the alleged inability of the jury adequately to separate the recidivist issue from
that of present guilt. To him, "it flouts human nature to suppose that a jury would
not consider a defendant's previous trouble with the law in deciding whether he
committed the crime currently charged...." Id. at 575 (Warren, C.J., and Fortas, J.,
dissenting). Balancing the interest of the accused against that of the state, the Chief
Justice did not consider this prejudice counterbalanced by any legitimate state interest.
Id. at 572-75.
As to the due process infirmity, the conclusion was predicated upon two contentions.
First, the Chief Justice concluded that the introduction of prior crimes evidence under
the Texas procedure cannot be justified by the rationale of other exceptions to the
general exclusionary rule, that is, relevance to guilt upon the substantive charge.
See, 385 U.S. at 576; Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 332, 336-38 (1965). A conclusion that only
evidence so relevant should be admitted follows logically from the basis for the ex-
clusionary rule: the danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evi-
dence unless it is substantially relevant to guilt of the crime charged. McCoPincK
§ 157; WHARTON § 232. Although it has been criticized, Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 763
(1961), the basic relevancy criterion has long been established. See Stone, The Rule of
Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence, 51 HARv. L. Riv. 988 (1938). The rule, however,
is one of evidence and not a constitutional mandate. But since the issue of recidivism
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Furthermore, the Court refused to weigh the existence of alternative
means for accomplishing the state's purpose but rather emphasized
that greater protection through another procedure cannot be de-
terminative of the validity of the procedure in question. 5
The Court's refusal to accord Spencer's objections a constitutional
basis sufficient to warrant federal interference may seem, at first
glance, conservative, and perhaps inconsistent with the Court's previ-
relates only to punishment, e.g., O'Brien v. State, 252 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 929 (1953), introduction of such evidence during the guilt-determina-
tion phase of the trial is arguably confined, aside from a convenience interest to the
state, to the function of showing criminal propensity, a purpose consistently held im-
proper. See Orfield, supra note 25, at 518-20.
Secondly, the Chief Justice found that since Texas denied Spencer and all other
defendants the right to stipulate as to recidivist status, a procedure which would have
obviated the necessity for a jury determination, the state cannot balance a convenience
factor against the prejudice to the accused. 385 U.S. at 580-82.
Although one may question the Chief Justice's premise since irrelevance has not been
found per se unconstitutional, his conclusions are logically developed. He does not,
however, speak to the question which would arise when the accused refused to stipu-
late. If in that circumstance the recidivist evidence may be properly introduced
during the guilt phase, the defendant is faced with a difficult choice: either he must
confess to the prior crimes and forego jury determination of that issue or submit to
introduction of recidivist evidence. See Note, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 238, 242 (1948);
Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 382, 388 (1965). To avoid this difficulty, a two-stage procedure
would seem necessary. Moreover, as Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out, even if the
defendant does stipulate, where the jury sets the punishment, a two-stage proceeding
would be required to keep the stipulated evidence from the jury when it is determining
guilt. 385 U.S. at 568 n.13. The necessity for two stages could be avoided in many
cases, however, once the stipulation has been made, by having the judge charge the
jury merely as to the penalty provided under the recidivist statute without informing
them of the rationale for that penalty. This may not be feasible, however, where the
severity of the penalty in relation to the ostensible crime would indicate to the jury
that more is involved than a single offense. In any event, positing the prejudicial
effect of the Texas procedure and the absence of a countervailing state interest, the
dissenting Justices deemed retention of the procedure improper in light of alterna-
tive methods to achieve the state's legitimate purpose. 885 U.S. at 571-72, 579, 586.
3 Id. at 568, 567-69. The non-determinative effect of alternative means has been
emphasized in previous decisions. See, e.g., Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 429-
81 (1948) (dictum); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
The majority clearly does not imply that the Texas procedure is the most desirable
or the most fair. As Mr. Justice Stewart stated in his concurring opinion: "If the
Constitution gave me a roving commission to impose . . . my own notions of en-
lightened policy, I would not join the Court's opinion. [I]t is clear to me that the
... procedures adopted in recent years by ... other States ... are far superior to those
utilized [here] .. . But the question for decision is not whether we applaud or
even whether we personally approve the procedures followed . . ... The question is
whether [they] . . . fall below the minimum level the Fourteenth Amendment will
tolerate." 385 U.S. at 569. The prevailing opinion is no less explicit: "To say that
. . . trial in the English-Connecticut style is probably the fairest, . . with which we
might well agree were the matter before us in a ... rule-making context, is a far cry from
a constitutional determination that this method . . . is compelled by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 567-68.
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ous determinations of limitations upon the state's permissible choice
of trial procedures.36 Specifically, Spencer may be difficult to reconcile
with Jackson v. Denno.37  Upon analysis, however, Spencer may be
seen as an indication of the scope of the fair trial concept and a
significant illustration of the Court's role in reviewing state criminal
procedures.
In Jackson v. Denno a state procedure whereby the jury deter-
mined the voluntariness of confessions 8 was held unconstitutional
because of the possibility that an involuntary confession would be the
de facto basis for a guilty verdict,8 9 a contingency long held to be
constitutional error.40  That decision implied that state criminal
procedures may violate due process not only when they are contrary
to "ordered liberty"41 but also when rationales for their use are
attenuated by potential injustice and the availability of viable altern-
atives.42 The Spencer Court, in dismissing Jackson, indicated that
'1 See, e.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Griffin v. California, 378 U.S.
609 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); notes 50-52 infra and accompanying
text.
-T 378 U.S. 368 (1964). It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice White, a member
of the majority in Spencer, wrote the majority opinion in Jackson. Thus, he is the
only member of the Court who concluded that the two cases should be differently
decided. The dissents in Jackson were based upon reasoning very similar to that sup-
porting the decision in Spencer; i.e., the jury may be relied upon to implement fairly
the procedure, id. at 405 (Black, J., dissenting), 426 (Clark, J., dissenting); the state
may thus validly delegate that function to the jury, id. at 430, 439 (Harlan, Clark
and Stewart, JJ., dissenting); and the existence of an alternative method is insufficient
to impugn the validity of the state procedure, id. at 436-40. See note 35 supra and
accompanying text.
18 378 U.S. at 391. Under the New York procedure invalidated in Jackson, the trial
judge first made a preliminary determination of the voluntariness of a confession. If
he found it involuntary, it was excluded. However, if there was a question as to
voluntariness, the court submitted that issue, along with others, to the jury. The jury
was instructed to disregard the confession if it was found to be involuntary, but if
voluntary then the jury was to determine its truth or reliability and weigh it
accordingly. Id. at 377-78.
3Id. at 388-91. The Court refused to assume that once the jury had found the
confession involuntary they would be able to expunge it from their minds in deter-
mining guilt. Id. at 388. Moreover, the Court held that even if the confession was
found voluntary, the evidence given the jury introduced impermissible considerations
of truthfulness into the question of voluntariness, and thus the determination could
not be consistently reliable. Id. at 386-87.
40 See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560 (1958); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S.
62 (1949); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936). See generally Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems
of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAut L. REV. 213, 233-40 (1959).
"1 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
"2 See The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HA.v. L. R1v. 177, 211-12 (1964); Note,
49 MINN. L. Rav. 360 (1964).
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the constitutional sanction may be successfully invoked only when
there is a clear danger that an identifiable and "specific constitu-
tional right,"43 such as that concerning involuntary confessions, may
be denied.
Nevertheless, it may be argued that Spencer's dismissal of Jackson
is unpersuasive as an absolute distinction. The sixth amendment
right to trial before an impartial jury has not been explicitly ex-
tended to state criminal proceedings.4 However, if the state grants
a jury trial, due process requires that the trial be conducted with
fairness, one aspect of which is an impartial jury.45 Since the consti-
tutional privilege against self-incrimination, which was endangered
in Jackson, is also encompassed within the fair trial concept, the
privilege may seem no more "specific" than the requirement of
impartial jurors. Thus, it may be argued that Jackson does bear
upon Spencer on the ground that the danger of jury failure in
Spencer is no less debilitating to specific constitutional rights than
in Jackson. The comparability of the two cases is further suggested
by the fact that only one of the Justices considered the cases dis-
tinguishable.46
On the other hand, a narrower construction of the interests in-
volved indicates that a valid distinction between Jackson and Spencer
may be made. In Jackson, the challenged evidence introduced to
the jury bore directly upon the question of guilt under the sub-
stantive charge. Moreover, if a confession is in fact involuntary, the
defendant has an affirmative right to have his confession excluded
from consideration by the jury, a right which arises directly from
the specific provision of the Constitution which protects against self-
"8 385 U.S. at 565.
"See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2-6 (1964); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). But cf. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363
(1966).
", See Note, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 349, 350-51 (1960); note 49 infra and cases cited
therein. The general concept of a fair trial has been consistently characterized as of
fundamental significance. "The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even
the minimal standards of due process." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). "A
fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Marshall v.
United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). It has also been emphasized that "a juror who
has formed an opinion cannot be impartial." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
155 (1878). However, the definition of what constitutes a fair trial, although given
specificity in individual cases, remains generally amorphous and unamenable to
definitive description. See Comment, 51 CoRuEuL L.Q. 306-07 (1966).
" See note 37 supra.
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incrimination through compelled testimony.47 By contrast, the
prejudice inhering in evidence of prior crimes has never been deemed
so invidious as to bar its admission in all cases. 48 That is, not only
is recidivist evidence in particular not directly related to guilt deter-
mination on the substantive charge, but in addition the accused has
no explicit constitutional right to demand the exclusion of such
evidence. Furthermore, the "right" to a fair trial claimed to have
been infringed in Spencer is an amorphous concept, determined
largely as a function of the particular facts and circumstances of each
case. 49 In Spencer, the Court indicated an unwillingness to inter-
vene under this broad doctrine so long as the more specific provisions
of the Constitution are not infringed, and the state procedure may
prejudice the defendant only if the jury fails its duty.50
It may also be argued that Spencer seems contradictory and per-
haps restrictive in light of the Court's previous determinations of
permissible trial procedure. It seems difficult to reconcile the preju-
dicial effect of extra-trial publication of criminal history or charac-
ter which has been held improper8 1 with the constitutionality of
in-court publication of similar information when it is irrelevant to
the substantive charge. Also, the gains won by assuring counsel to
each defendant 52 become less significant when that counsel must
'7 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
48 See note 26 supra.
"0See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); United States v. Wood,
299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1986); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116-17 (1934); Com-
ment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306-07 (1966); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 217, 221 & n.17
(1962); Comment, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 672, 673-76 (1965). "Due process . . . requires
that the proceedings shall be fair, but fairness is a relative, not an absolute concept."
Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra at 116.
50 See 385 U.S. at 568-69. The prevailing opinion in Spencer thus may be seen as
a logical sequel to the dissents by four of the Justices in Jackson, see note 37 supra,
whereby the rationale of the latter decision has been limited to situations involving
explicit rights where the danger of jury incompetence may seriously threaten the pro-
tection they afford. In Spencer, doubt as to jury competence did not dispell the
Court's general faith in that body because no "specific constitutional right," in the
narrow sense, was endangered. Therefore, the Court refused to "take Jackson as
evincing a general distrust ... of the ability of juries to approach their task responsibly,"
385 U.S. at 565, and limited the extent to which allegations of jury failure may serve
as a predicate for unconstitutionality.
"I See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 466 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); ci. Marshall v. United States, 360
U.S. 310 (1959) (jurors during trial read of previous crimes in newspapers, trial held
invalid under Court's supervisory power).
"2 See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
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contend with a jury prejudiced by information irrelevant to his case
but which he is powerless to discredit or eliminate. Moreover, the
traditional presumption of innocence under our criminal system 8
may be jeopardized by the free introduction of recidivist evidence.
The decision in Spencer, however, is less inconsistent with these
strains of the fair trial concept than it is illustrative of the scope and
content of that concept. Thus, Spencer may be distinguished from
two extensive categories of previous decisions concerning criminal
procedure. In the first instance, the allegation of unconstitutionality
in the instant case was not predicated upon any fundamental consti-
tutional provision,54 such as that of counsel, 5 confrontation 0 or self-
incrimination by compulsion.57 Secondly, the alleged prejudice
emanated from a state statute implementing within the courtroom a
legitimate state purpose. Spencer is therefore removed from that
category of cases dealing with the improper effect of non-legislative
or extra-judicial factors.58 So distinguished, Spencer indicates that
absent the elements of an explicitly stated constitutional protection
or allegations of extra-judicial prejudicial influence, considerations of
jury incompetence and alternative means merit little weight as con-
stitutional determinants warranting interference with an area largely
considered state prerogative.59
The question remains, however, whether a petitioner so situated
as Spencer can ever succeed in acquiring a reversal of his conviction.
11 9 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2497 (1), 2511 (3d ed. 1940).
"The petitioner did, however, allege violation of his right to an impartial jury
under the sixth amendment, but the Court did not consider this issue. See note 28
supra.
"E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
"1 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
57E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959).
"s See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (knowing use of false evidence by
prosecution); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (bailiff told jury defendant was
guilty); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (prejudicial publicity); Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532 (1965) (television disrupting trial hearing); Turner v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 466 (1965) (sheriffs in custody of jury were chief prosecution witnesses); Rideau
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (prejudicial pre-trial publicity); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961) (jurors read of defendant's criminal record in newspapers); Alcorta v.
Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (perjured testimony known to prosecution). See generally
McCarthy, Fair Trial and Prejudicial Publicity: A Need for Reform, 17 HASnNS .J.
79 (1965); Comment, 51 CoRNE.L L.Q. 306, 308-13 (1966).
59 See note 69 infra and accompanying text.
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Theoretically, a sufficient indication of the jury's lapse would swing
the balance in favor of the challenges. Yet Spencer seems not to be
based upon mere failure of proof of prejudice; rather, the Court
attempted to preclude effective proof by adopting an attitude of
judicial restraint in the state evidentiary procedures.60 Two related
themes may be postulated as bases for the Court's cautious approach
in Spencer. On a pragmatic level, Spencer implies that the Court
is unwilling to open itself for determination of a broad range of
difficult procedural problems which could arise under state evi-
dentiary rules. Mr. Justice Harlan referred to two examples: mul-
tiple offenses tried against a single defendant and a single trial of
joint defendants in which evidence as to one crime or to the guilt of
one of the defendants is introduced regardless of a potentially preju-
dicial effect upon the other issues. 6' Similarly, there is a problem
when the confession of one defendant is admitted in the course of a
joint trial.62  With reference to evidence of prior crimes in par-
ticular, a number of other applications may be claimed to give rise
to a constitutional issue on the basis of collateral prejudice.63  Un-
questionably, some rules are potentially more prejudicial than others.
Moreover, there is considerable diversity among the jurisdictions
concerning the permissible scope of cross-examination, the extent to
which and when the defendant may waive his privilege against self-
incrimination, and the manner in which the voluntariness of con-
fessions should be properly determined.6 4 Further evidentiary prob-
00 Ibid.
61 385 U.S. at 562. See, e.g., United States v. Margeson, 261 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Pa.
1966); People v. Cerullo, 18 N.Y.2d 839, 222 N.E.2d 605 (1966).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966) (confession of one
defendant held inadmissible), 1967 DuKE L.J. 202; Note, 22 WASH. & Lm L. Rlv. 285
(1965).
08 Other problems involving the use of prior crimes evidence concern the range
of crimes which may be introduced and the degree of relevance required for introduc-
tion when such evidence is produced for purposes of impeaching the defendant as a
witness. The standards also differ when such evidence is used to discredit other wit-
nesses. See Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes Not Charged in the Indictment,
31 ORE. L. Rav. 267 (1952); Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 774-82 (1961). While the
exceptions in these instances are supported by arguments of probative value, questions
concerning the extent to which this justification may be carried lend themselves to a
fair trial controversy. Similar difficulties arise with respect to the other exceptions to
the exclusionary rule. See Wall, Judicial Admissions: Their Use in Criminal Trials,
53 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 15, 18-23 (1962). See generally MAGUtRE, WmaNSMIN, CHAD-
BOURN & MANSFIELD, EVIDENCE 561-613 (1965).
6 See generally Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant, 78 H ARv.
L. REv. 426, 426-32 (1964).
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lems involve the prejudicial effect of gruesome exhibits, qualifica-
tions for expert witnesses, and the extent to which stipulation will
prevent introduction of relevant, but potentially prejudicial, facts.65
Although the Court has been in contact with some of these ques-
tions,6 6 Spencer manifests disdain for any but the most necessary
interference where the "rules concerning evidence.., are complex,
and vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction."67  Any other holding
might subject the Court to a deluge of evidence-oriented "fair trial"
issues, in consideration of which the Court would be unable to
apply a specific constitutional provision such as in Jackson but
instead would be required constantly to evaluate the ill-defined in-
terests of state and defendant. Although the opposite result in
Spencer would have been relatively easy to rationalize, it would have
at least furnished a basis for objection to each of the other exceptions
to the general rule excluding evidence of prior crimes. Cognizant
of this, the Court chose to avoid the problem in cases where the
state rule may be supported by reference to valid state interest and
the prejudice resultant from the rule is deemed less serious in the
absence of an alleged violation of a specific constitutional right.,8
In addition to and embracing the pragmatic considerations, the
Spencer majority emphasized the propriety of limiting the federal
role in governing state evidentiary procedures because of the states'
traditional discretion in that area.69 In so doing, the Court did not
81 See Wall, supra note 62, at 15-25.
60 See, e.g., Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957) (admission of co.defen-
dant's confession in federal trial upheld); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954)
(exculpatory extrajudidal statements require corroboration in federal courts).
67 385 U.S. at 560.
68 See notes 88-42, 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
69 Mr. Justice Harlan repeatedly emphasized that the Texas procedure was chosen
by that state through a valid exercise of its power to select criminal procedures which
it determined were best suited to the circumstances. 385 U.S. at 560, 562-64, 567-68.
Therefore, federal judicial interference "would be a wholly unjustifiable encroach-
ment by this Court upon the constitutional power of States to promulgate their own
rules of evidence to try their own state-created crimes in their own state courts, so long
as ... not prohibited by... the... Constitution, which these rules are not." Id. at
568-69.
In so grounding the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan reaffirmed his persistent
campaign involving respect for the state's inherent powers in the federal system and
opposition to over-zealous review of state procedures. For the Justice, the separation
of powers lies "at the root of our constitutional system." Harlan, The Bill of Rights
and the Constitution, 50 A.BA.J. 918, 920 (1964). See Reynolds v. Sims, 877 U.S. 588,
624 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Thus Mr. Justice Harlan would not only impose a
different standard on the states from that governing the federal courts with regard
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specify that the presumption of constitutionality will be stronger
where the general concept of due process is alleged to have been
violated than where an explicit provision of the Bill of Rights is
asserted. However, the decision does imply that the absence of
allegations under such a specific provision is a factor which may
weigh heavily upon the Court's willingness to interfere with state
criminal procedures.
The significance of Spencer is likely to be in its application of
judicial restraint rather than in its effect upon recidivist procedures.
Objections to the unfairness of the common law procedure have
steadily depleted the ranks of its practitioners insofar as the practice
to the rights of the accused, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring), but he maintains that it is the "essence of our federalism that the States
should have the widest latitude in the administration of their own system of criminal
justice." Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 468 (1958). See Jackson v. Denno., 378
U.S. 368, 427-40 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mason, The Supreme Court and
Federalism, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 1187, 1188, 1200-04 (1966).
Mr. Justice Black has also recently urged a measure of judicial self-restraint upon
the Court. While differing from Mr. Justice Harlan on the application of the Bill of
Rights to the states, which he feels should be specifically incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment (Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960)), Mr.
Justice Black complements his brother by criticizing the use of the fourteenth amend-
ment as a vehicle to impose the personal predilections of the judge upon the
states. See Mason, supra at 1204. Mr. Justice Black's concern with judicial restraint
was expressed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where he objected to that
decision's implication of a "great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts" which
would "take away much of the power of States to govern themselves which the Consti-
tution plainly intended them to have." Id. at 521 (dissenting opinion). This view
had earlier been presented in the trial procedure context. Dissenting in part to Jackson
v. Denno, supra at 407-08, Mr. Justice Black concisely stated his objection to peripheral
broadening of the due process clause: "My wide difference with the Court is in its
apparent holding that it has the constitutional power to change state trial procedures
because of its belief they are not fair. [N]o constitutional provision ... gives this Court
any such law-making power." This objection is underlined in Spencer's refusal to in-
validate the Texas procedure on grounds of "fairness." See 385 U.S. at 567-68.
Mr. Justice Stewart likewise has objected to notions of propriety as constitutional
standards and the unimpeded interference of the Court in state criminal procedures.
See Jackson v. Denno, supra (joining the dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.); Griswold
v. Connecticut, supra at 527-31 (dissenting opinion of Stewart, J.); Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 617-23 (1965) (dissenting opinion of Stewart, J.); MASON, THE SuPREME
CouRT 169 (1962). Although Justice White's position may seem ambiguous, compare
Jackson v. Denno, supra with Spencer, both he and Mr. Justice Clark have counseled
a tolerant approach to issues raised by state procedures. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 499-504 (opinion of Clark, J.), 526-45 (White, J., dissenting; note also his
joinder in the dissent of Harlan, J.); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495-99 (1965)
(White, Stewart, and Clark, JJ., dissenting); Jackson v. Denno, supra at 423-27 (Clark,
J., dissenting); Griffin v. California, supra at 623 (Stewart and White, JJ., dissenting)
("formulation of procedural rules to govern the administration of criminal justice in the
... states ... is a matter of local concern"); MASON, supra at 169; Weihafen, Supreme
Court Review of State Criminal Procedures, 10 J. LEGAL HIsT. 189, 196-97 (1966).
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has been abandoned or modified by courts7" and legislatures.7 1 It
seems unlikely that Spencer will reverse this voluntary trend. More-
over, as a bow to the federal system, the decision perhaps should not
be Jxtended beyond the circumstances in which it arose. From a
practical viewpoint, the Court dealt largely with a dying issue. Since
only a few states presently retain the procedure in its most objec-
tionable form,72 it may be argued that Spencer is largely an exercise
in judicial expendiency. More realistically, however, Spencer in-
dicates an important restriction upon the Court's willingness to define
the limits of permissible state criminal procedure. 3 The decision
may mean that where a state procedure complies with the funda-
mental provisions of the Constitution, the procedure may be retained
if disapproval would require a delicate balancing of the indefinite
interests of state and individual not only in the case at hand but also
in an entire range of related problems. If Spencer is in fact so di-
rected, it represents less a pragmatic sidestep than a significant limita-
tion upon the scope of the fair trial concept.
7o See note 19 supra.
71 See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1085 (1954); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-5 (1953).
7 2 ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 331 (1959); Yates v. State, 245 Ala. 490, 17 So. 2d 777 (1944);
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2511 (Supp. 1966); HAWAII REV. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 28, 43 (1955);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2208 (1956); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 747.1-.7 (1950); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 431.190 (1962). But see Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.2d 891, overruled, Etherton
v. Commonwealth, 335 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1960); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 25 (1956);
MONT. REV. CODE § 94-4713 (1947); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 591.1 (1955); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 15-147 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-21 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-553.1
to .3 (1962); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (1957); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-11 (1957). Three
states expressly provide for stipulation: Aiuz. R. CUM. PROC. 180 (1950); CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1025 (j); Wisconsin, State v. Meyer, 258 Wis. 326, 46 N.W.2d 341 (1951).
78 Since Spencer, the Court has reversed one decision invalidating the common law
recidivist procedure, United States ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle, 349 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.
1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 14 (1967) (per curiam), and refused to consider several other
appeals arising under the Texas procedure, e.g., Barlow v. State, 398 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.
Crim. 1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 16 (1967) (per curiam); Platt v. State, 402
S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Crim. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 929 (1967); Ross v. State, 406
S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Crim. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 938 (1967); Howard v. State,
387 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Crim. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 938 (1967); Stoneham v.
State, 389 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Crim. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 928 (1967).
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